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Roosevelt played the major role in shaping the postwar world.
Under his aegis, a series of international conferences elaborated
blueprints for the cooperative components of the postwar world
order: for what became the United Nations (at Dumbarton
Oaks), for world finance (at Bretton Woods), for food and agri-
culture (at Hot Springs), for relief and rehabilitation (in Wash-
ington), and for civil aviation (in Chicago).'
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U NFORTUNATELY, THE CHICAGO Conference of 1944was a failure by many measures. n November 30, 1944,
with the meeting already extended for five days, the New York
Daily News headlines read, "Parley to End With Air Pact Row
Unresolved." On the following day the conference was called "a
flop" by the same paper. The London Times reported, "Confer-
ence a Failure."2
The meeting produced one of the most effective international
organizations in the United Nations system, but that's not what
it set out to do. The U.S. objective was to set up an international
air transport regime allowing the "free" flow of air transport be-
tween countries with frequencies determined by the market
rather than bilateral agreements-what today would be called a
global system of "open skies." Other representatives had a post-
war system in mind that was regulated with a far more heavy
hand of government. The result was, with regard to economic
issues, quite unsatisfactory for both.
On the technical side the picture was much more encourag-
ing. Fiorello La Guardia, Mayor of New York, was a member of
the U.S. Delegation and he is reputed to have explained the
technical accomplishments of the meeting with "everybody is
against bad weather."' In fact, twelve subcommittees of the con-
ference each produced draft technical annexes on subjects in-
cluding Airways Systems, Rules of the Air, Licensing,
Airworthiness, Charts and Maps, and Search and Rescue, each
of which was close to the substance of the corresponding An-
nexes in existence today.
So the disaster about to befall the Conference, alluded to in
the newspaper headlines, was not on technical matters but on
the economic regulation of air transport. Neither side won a
clear victory. The resulting compromise was relatively simple.
The draft Convention establishing the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization (ICAO) said little on the air transport issue.
Instead, two other agreements were presented. The Interna-
tional Air Services Agreement4 established the first two free-
doms of right of transit and the right to land for non-traffic
2 Duane Freer, ICAO at 50 Years: Riding the Flywheels of Technoloy, ICAO J., Nov.
1994, at 26.
3 Stokely W. Morgan, International Civil Aviation Conference at Chicago, in WHAT
IT MEANS TO TIHE AMERICAS 12 (1945).
4 International Air Services Transit Agreement, opened for signature Dec. 7,
1944, 59 Stat.1693, 84 U.N.T.S. 389.
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purposes. The International Air Transport Agreement5 estab-
lished the four basic freedoms, with an option for the fifth. The
former took effect; the latter was only recognized in the Western
Hemisphere. Resolution of the air transport question largely re-
mained for bilateral negotiations.
In addition, the meeting produced the Interim Agreement'
setting up a Provisional International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion, to remain in effect until a permanent convention was rati-
fied; a permanent Convention 7 establishing an International
Civil Aviation Organization with advisory powers and laying
down certain air navigation principles that shall be followed by
the signatories; and the above referenced drafts of Technical
Annexes to the Convention.
The Provisional ICAO came into existence on June 6, 1945.8
The first meeting of the Provisional Council convened in Mon-
treal on August 15, 1945 with 19 of the 20 States elected to the
Council by the Chicago Conference attending. 9
The permanent body was formally constituted on April 4,
1947, thirty days after the deposit of the twenty-sixth ratification
of the Convention."' The First ICAO Assembly convened shortly
thereafter on May 6, 1947, and the Council met on May 28,
1947, one day after the close of the Assembly.
In 1946 the United States and the United Kingdom, meeting
on the island of Bermuda, reached an agreement on air trans-
port rights.1 The Bermuda Agreement was the model for all
, International Air Transport Agreement, opened for signature Dec. 7, 1944,
59 Stat. 1701, 171 U.N.T.S. 387.
6 Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization, Report on the Work of
the Organization for the period 6 June 1945 - 30 April 1946, presented by In-
terim Council to the First Interim Assembly of ICAO; Doc 1554, Chapter 1, page
1-2.
7 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, TIAS
No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, available at www.icao.int.
8 The Provisional ICAO was limited to three years, so it was scheduled to end
its existence on June 6, 1948.
9 The nineteen were Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada Chile, China, Colom-
bia, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, El Salvador, France, India, Iraq, the Netherlands,
Norway, Peru, Turkey, the united Kingdom and the United States. Mexico at-
tended the third session beginning on January 21, 1946. Provisional ICAO, Re-
port on the Work of the Organization, supra note 6, at 9.
10 In fact, by April 4, 1947, 38 States had notified ICAO of their ratification of
the Convention.
11 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the United Kingdom Relating to Air Services Between Their
Respective Terrtories, Feb. 11, 1946, 60 Stat. 1499, T.I.A.S. No. 1507 [hereinafter
Bermuda Agreement].
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such air transport agreements for years to come, establishing a
bilateral and relatively restrictive system in place of the multilat-
eral and open regime that was unreachable in Chicago.
I. ICAO STANDARDS
As ofJune 20, 2002, some 188 States have acceded to the Chi-
cago Convention (the Convention) and are members of ICAO.
Each member State has agreed (see articles 37 and 38 of the
Convention) to comply with the standards and procedures set
forth in the (now) 18 Technical Annexes to the Convention, or
to specifically notify ICAO of its inability to do so. Participants
in the Chicago Convention felt that to make ICAO Standards
mandatory on States would be a negation of state sovereignty,
but to make the standards less than mandatory would make
them ineffective. The solution was to make the standards
mandatory unless a State files a "difference" to that standard.
ICAO in turn publishes these "differences" for the use of other
States, which may or may not agree to accept them. (While
compliance with the standards of ICAO is not mandatory, it is
also true that another State may decline to accept air transport
operations that do not comply with the standards of ICAO in
some material way.)
The 18 Annexes to the Convention contain detailed standards
and recommended practices that should be followed by all
member States in establishing and carrying out government re-
sponsibilities related to civil aviation:
Annex 1: Personnel Licensing
Annex 2: Rules of the Air
Annex 3: Meteorological Service for International Air Navi-
gation
Annex 4: Aeronautical Charts
Annex 5: Units of Measurement to be used in Air and
Ground Operations
Annex 6: International Commercial Air Transport
Annex 7: Operation of Aircraft
Annex 8: Airworthiness of Aircraft
Annex 9: Facilitation
Annex 10: Aeronautical Telecommunications
Annex 11: Air Traffic Services
Annex 12: Search and Rescue
Annex 13: Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation
Annex 14: Aerodromes
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Annex 15: Aeronautical Information Services
Annex 16: Environmental Protection
Annex 17: Security
Annex 18: The Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air
Supplements to each Annex contain detailed lists of each spe-
cific difference notified to ICAO between the national regula-
tions of States and the corresponding international standards
contained in the Annex.
In its present form, the Convention and its Annexes remain
the fundamental basis for promoting safety of flight throughout
the world. But the Convention is not a self-executing docu-
ment. If a country is to reap the many benefits of international
commercial air transportation, the country has agreed, by the
terms of the Convention, to provide for safety oversight of those
operations. Governments do not always recognize this obliga-
tion. From our experience, many governments that do recog-
nize their safety oversight obligations have certainly not devoted
adequate resources to fulfilling those obligations.
A. FAA INTERNATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY ASSESSMENT
(IASA) PROGRAM
In years past, the United States had assumed that countries
which had acceded to the Chicago Convention were complying
with its provisions governing safety of flight operations. There
was no enforcement of this obligation, nor was an enforcement
mechanism provided for in the Convention. Then on January
25, 1990, Avianca Flight 52, a Boeing 707 that had left Bogotdi
for New York's John F. Kennedy Airport via Medellin, ran out of
fuel and crashed at Cove Neck, New York, killing 73 people.
This tragic accident gave rise to considerable publicity drawing
attention to the differences between U.S. Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration safety standards and those followed by the civil avia-
tion authorities of other nations.12 The debate was fueled by
commercial interests of a number of operators in the Southeast-
ern U.S. who complained that airlines operating under non-U.S.
flags were able to undercut the U.S. carriers because of the sub-
stantially lower costs of inadequate foreign safety regulations." :
12 See, e.g., Glen Kessler and Ford Fessenden, Flying at Risk, NEW YORK NEWSDAY,
Dec. 16-20, 1990 (5 part series of articles).
13 Government Oversight of Loophole Airlines: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investi-
gations & Oversight of the House Comm. on Public Works & Transp., 102 Cong. 45
(June 4, 1991).
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Congress heard the complaints of airlines that felt pressures
of unfair competition, and was concerned about the apparent
lack of FAA oversight of foreign airlines. In fact, a major part of
this concern arose from the practice of a few U.S. citizens who
established foreign flag airlines operating outside the U.S., es-
caping much of the regulatory reach of U.S. authorities. These
airlines exploited the "loopholes" in the system by transporting
cargo between, for example, Miami and South America under a
non-U.S. flag and without the need to have detailed FAA
oversight.
In Congressional hearings held in mid-1991, FAA noted that
it prescribes a very limited regulatory framework 4 for non-U.S.
airlines that either operate into the U.S., or operate U.S.-regis-
tered aircraft anywhere in the world. FAA announced that it was
changing its policy as regards safety oversight of non-U.S. air-
lines that operate into the US, and would for the first time "ex-
amine more closely the capabilities of foreign civil aviation
authorities to meet their surveillance and oversight responsibili-
ties under international law."15 Thus began FAA International
Aviation Safety Assessment (LASA) Program.
FAA has no regulations that require a non-U.S. airline to com-
ply with standards of ICAO. Indeed, ICAO standards are not
directly applicable to the airlines, but are for a government to
apply as part of its oversight of airlines. The Department of
Transportation, however, licenses non-U.S. airlines to operate
into the U.S. under terms of a bilateral air transport agree-
ment. ' " Part of the process of licensing requires that DOT make
a finding of fitness of the carrier to perform the requested oper-
ations.' 7 This fitness finding includes an evaluation of the ade-
quacy of safety oversight provided by the country whose flag is
flown by the airline. Thus, the legal thread that gives efficacy to
the IASA program runs primarily through the DOT legal au-
14 See 14 C.F.R. pt. 129.
15 Government Oversight of Loophole Airlines: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investi-
gations & Oversight of the House Comm. on Public Works & Transp., 102 Cong. 45
(June 4, 1991) (testimony of AnthonyJ. Broderick, FAA Associate Administrator
for Regulation and Certification).
16 Bilateral Air Transport Agreements contain a basic safety clause requiring
adherence to the safety provisions of the Convention. See, e.g., Robert D. Papkin
(Squire, Sanders and Dempsey L.L.P., Washington, DC), Some Comments on Inter-
national Aviation Safety Oversight and the IASA Program of the FAA, ABA Forum on
Air & Space Law, 2000 Annual Meeting and Conference, Montreal, Canada, Aug.
4, 2000.
17 See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. §§ 211, 302.
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thorities, not FAA regulations. FAA acts as the technical arm of
the U.S. Government, but the ability to give legal substance to
FAA technical findings lies in the ability of the DOT to grant or
revoke commercial authority to operate into the U.S.
That said, there is concern in some quarters that FAA has
used its regulatory authority in the conduct of the IASA pro-
gram in ways that go beyond what 14 C.F.R. pt. 129 provides.
Among other things, foreign airlines that operate into the U.S.
are issued, under 14 C.F.R. pt. 129, "operations specifications"
that regulate and restrict their operations.' 8 These operations
specifications list each specific aircraft that the carrier is permit-
ted to use in operations into the U.S., and what routes may be
flown. When FAA has determined that the country of the car-
rier does not satisfactorily implement ICAO safety oversight
standards, it is by enforcement of these "op specs" that restric-
tions are imposed on a carrier. Some argue that FAA's use of
the operations specifications in this manner in practice goes be-
yond the authority conveyed by 14 C.F.R. pt. 129, but the issue
has never been brought to the courts.
II. EARLY DAYS OF JASA
The JASA program was intended to be conducted in accor-
dance with newly developed guidance material and well-docu-
mented policies, to determine other countries' compliance with
ICAO standards.' 9 Like many good intentions, this intent took a
long time to realize and is in fact only now becoming a reality.
The program began with undocumented and non-standardized
assessments, by specialists in flight operations and maintenance
regulations, of whether a country complied with the minimum
standards for aviation safety oversight as contained in Annexes
1, 6, and 8 to the Convention. With airlines from nearly 100
countries serving the U.S. at the time, a method needed to be
developed to select the order in which countries would be as-
sessed. An informal policy quickly became "the rule:" Since
DOT had to make new findings each time a country's airlines
established new service or expanded existing service, DOT and
FAA staff agreed that a positive FAA assessment would be a pre-
requisite for those changes. Countries whose safety oversight
appeared to be questionable, and countries that actively sought
18 14 C.F.R. pt. 129.
19 See Government Oversight of Loophole Airlines, Hearing Record, supra note 13.
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FAA assessment assistance, were dealt with next. The remaining
countries were to be handled as time permitted.
FAA assessments initially resulted in one of 3 categorizations.
Category 1 countries were those whose safety oversight was de-
termined by FAA to meet the requirements of ICAO. Category
3 countries were those whose safety oversight was found by FAA
not to meet the minimum requirements of ICAO, and whose
airlines did not serve the U.S. Category 2 countries similarly
were determined not to meet the minimum ICAO safety over-
sight standards, but the situation was deemed to be not so seri-
ous as to place them in Category 3, thereby denying their
airlines the right to fly to the United States. Rather, initial in-
tentions were to reserve Category 2 as a temporary one, with the
full expectation that (1) the safety oversight of the foreign gov-
ernment combined with increased surveillance of U.S. opera-
tions by its carriers at U.S. airports provided adequate assurance
of safe operations to the traveling public; and (2) the country
was working diligently to correct the shortcomings identified by
FAA, and would work its way out of Category 2 within a short
period (perhaps 6 months to a year). Since countries in Cate-
gory 2 did not meet the minimum safety oversight standards of
ICAO, DOT staff would be unable to make a finding that their
carriers were fit for any expanded or new airline operations.
Thus, their operations were "frozen" at the level permitted at
the time of the assessment. This, FAA believed, provided an ec-
onomic incentive for the airlines to pressure their governments
to correct the oversight deficiencies cited in order that the air-
lines might be permitted to expand their services to the United
States.
For many reasons, FAA plans and expectations were unful-
filled, and the first few years of IASA activity generated many
complaints of inconsistent application of policy, an absence of
transparency, a lack of coordination with ICAO, and an absence
of documented operating guidance to both inspectors and those
subject to assessment." Many of these complaints were not with-
out basis.
One of the early determinations made was that 22 countries
would enjoy presumptive "Category 1" status.2' Australia, Ca-
211 See, e.g., Papkin, op cit.
21 In fact, what happened was that some countries in whose safety oversight
performance FAA staff had full confidence were immediately listed in Category 1,
and several European States whose oversight capabilities were not so well known
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nada, Japan and New Zealand are countries with which the U.S.
enjoys close and long-standing cooperation in civil aviation, and
FAA believed that it knew well their compliance with ICAO stan-
dards. In the case of the 18 European nations that were, in the
early 1990's, full members of the Joint Aviation Authorities
(JAA), FAA elected to recognize the capability of the JAA to en-
sure those countries' compliance with ICAO standards,22 and
forego independent unilateral FAA assessments. FAA had, for
some time, participated with JAA on inspection standardization
teams in Europe, evaluating the oversight of JAA member coun-
tries. FAA, by this experience, had confidence in JAA technical
ability to ensure that member States of JAA had in place appro-
priate safety oversight systems. In fact, this "recognition" of JAA
was done in no small part to bolster the standing of JAA in the
international community and provide more incentive forJAA to
provide international leadership in operational airline safety
oversight. Until that time, JAA emphasis had largely been on
the certification of design, construction and series production
of civil aircraft, with less attention being given to operational
airline safety matters.2 3
For the first three years or so, FAA Assessments were done
without public announcement of their findings. FAA believed
that it would politicize the process to trumpet shortcomings in
safety oversight in the public arena. Since FAA had determined
that identified deficiencies for countries whose airlines contin-
ued to operate into the U.S. (i.e., Category 2 countries) were
not so serious as to present an immediate danger to the travel-
ing public, FAA reasoned that the public interest would be best
served by rapid correction of the deficiencies by specialists,
rather than protracted arguments in a more political environ-
ment. Findings of the FAA assessments typically included one
or more of the following:
" outdated or otherwise inadequate legislation and support-
ing regulations;
" inadequate system for the initial certification of air carri-
ers in accordance with ICAO provisions;
to FAA were simply not listed until their oversight status was (informally) notified
to FAA by the Joint Aviation Authorities.
22 AnthonyJ. Broderick, International Aviation Safety Oversight, Chicago Conven-
tion 50th Anniversary Conference, Chicago, IL, Oct. 31, 1994.
23 This recognition was not without problems, most recently illustrated by the
FAA categorization of Greece as a Category 2 country, with unacceptable safety
oversight of its airlines.
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" inadequate operator surveillance following initial issuance
of air operator certificate;
" lack of properly approved operations/maintenance manu-
als and minimum equipment lists typical on flight crew
training programs and proficiency checks;
" performance of aircraft maintenance by mechanics with-
out proper licenses; and
* excessive flight duty times between rest periods.
On September 2, 1994, the Department of Transportation an-
nounced, with some fanfare, that of thirty states assessed by FAA,
nine states were found not meeting ICAO standards and four
states received conditional approval. 24 The states were identi-
fied by name. Initially this public disclosure was not enthusiasti-
cally embraced at the technical levels in FAA. Many felt that
public disclosure would make it more difficult to gain the coop-
eration of the subject State. The political position was that the
public has a right to know when a safety problem has been iden-
tified. Public disclosure became firmly established as a principle
of public policy in regard to IASA.25
A. ICAO EFFORTS TO CREATE AN ASSESSMENT PROGRAM
Public announcement of IASA Assessment results26 made a
great difference in the minds of other nations, and of ICAO.
FAA put effort into working to encourage ICAO itself to move to
a program to address the problems with safety oversight. This
was difficult for several reasons. First, ICAO is a relatively small
organization, with substantially fewer than 100 professional spe-
cialists in the Air Navigation Bureau, the unit that would (and
now does) administer such a program of assessments. Second,
the U.S. and its closest allies have long forced ICAO to adhere to
24 Of the thirty-three States, twenty-two were in Latin America and the Carib-
bean, four were in Africa and the Middle East, two were in Asia-Pacific and two in
Eastern Europe.
25 This was a good thing. In the end, it is clear that without the full commit-
ment and eager support of the political leadership in a country that does not
have adequate safety oversight, the deficiencies will not soon be corrected. On
the other hand, with that high level commitment, the documentation of the stan-
dards in ICAO Annexes, and now in extensive handbooks and related guidance
material, makes it possible for countries with even relatively modest economies to
successfully establish appropriate safety oversight systems.
26 A continuously updated list of FAA assessment findings may be found at the
FAA web site, http://www.faa.gov/avr/iasa/index.htm.
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a "zero real growth" budget.27 Proposing such a large new pro-
gram without "breaking the bank" was not something that ap-
peared feasible. Finally, most States were not viewed as
potentially receptive to the idea of others coming in to evaluate
the quality of their safety oversight performance. On the other
hand, many countries called for a more "balanced" multilateral
approach, rather than the unilateral program of the U.S. An
approach to ICAO was initiated.
In 1992 the United States prepared a working paper, cospon-
sored by Canada, for the 29th ICAO Assembly. The paper
called attention to the deficiencies that had been found in safety
oversight and emphasized the need for safety oversight improve-
ment. Assembly Resolution A29-13 included the following
language:
" Reaffirm that individual State's responsibility for safety
oversight is one of the tenets of the Convention.
" Call on contracting States to reaffirm their safety oversight
obligations, especially the important safety provisions con-
tained in Annexes 1 and 6 of the Chicago Convention.
" Urge contracting States to review their national legislation
implementing those obligations and to review their safety
oversight procedures to ensure effective implementation.
" Call on all States able to do so to provide requesting States
with technical cooperation in the form of financial and
technical resources to enable those States to carry out
their responsibilities for safety oversight of air carrier
operations.
The adoption of this resolution marked the beginning of
ICAO's rapid transition from an organization that had written,
but not in any way policed, aviation safety standards to an organ-
ization that today puts the promotion of proper safety oversight
at the top of its priority list.
Between 1992 and 1995, FAA made major efforts to bolster its
international staff and encourage other States to live up to the
safety oversight obligations of the Convention. ICAO also re-
viewed States' safety oversight standards, as part of a Technical
Cooperation Project, and found an alarming lack of compliance
with ICAO standards in 6 States of the Asia-Pacific region. 8 De-
27 At least on an informal basis, the G7 countries-The U.S., Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan and the UK-have consistently voted in block for these
strict controls on ICAO expenditures for many years.
28 Letter from David Hinson, FAA Administrator to Dr. Philippe Rochat, Secre-
tary General, ICAO (Mar. 30, 1994).
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spite the very great difficulties that such a policy change im-
plied, senior people at ICAO and representatives to ICAO from
a number of countries began to support an ICAO assessment
program of some kind.
The ICAO Council approved the Safety Oversight Program, as
well as the related mechanism for financial and technical contri-
butions from member States, on June 7, 1995. The program was
endorsed by the 31st Session of the Assembly in October of that
year and became operational in March 1996.
Between June 1995 and March 1996, a great deal of effort
went into the organization of the material on which to base the
conduct of the assessment and the development of a training
course for members of the assessment teams. Using voluntary
contributions of funds and personnel from a number of States, a
great volume of high quality material was developed for use by
the assessors from ICAO, for their training, and as detailed ref-
erence material for member states.
The program included not only assessments, but also a
mandatory training program for assessment team members,
safety oversight seminars/workshops conducted by ICAO for the
benefit of member States and the follow-up activity. This follow-
up frequently included the assistance (on a reimbursable basis)
of the ICAO Technical Cooperation Bureau (TCB), a section of
ICAO devoted to providing training and other assistance to
ICAO member States on a reimbursable basis.
The Safety Oversight Program initially had four primary
characteristics:
1. the assessment;
2. funded by State contributions;
3. on a voluntary basis; and
4. with confidential findings.2 9
The secretariat issued a Council working paper containing a
progress report on the implementation of the original pro-
gram."' It included the following numbers:
2 1 While the reports generated by the assessments were confidential there was
a provision to provide other contracting states with a summary report of the find-
ings. However these summary reports were written in such general terms that
they were basically useless.
o PROGRESS REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ICAO SAFETY OVERSIGHT
PROGRAMME AND ITS TRANSITION TOWARDS THE ICAO UNIVERSAL SAFETY OVER-
SIGHT AUDIT PROGRAMME (ICAO Council, Working Paper C-WP/10995, 1998).
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" Thirteen States had made financial contributions to the
program.3
" Six States had seconded experts to the program at
ICAO Headquarters and seven other States had as-
signed experts to safety Oversight assessment missions.
" Twenty-six States informed ICAO that they did not re-
quire an assessment.
" Eighty-eight States requested an assessment.
" Sixty-seven of those States had been assessed.
" Thirty-five of those States had submitted an action plan
(eight prepared by the ICAO TCB).
" Seventeen other States had requested TCB to prepare a
Project Document/Action Plan.
This means that:
* Less than half of the States (47%) requested an
assessment.
" Around seventy States didn't even respond to the ques-
tion in the working paper asking if they desired an
assessment.
" Almost seventy percent of the South American States re-
quested assessments.
" Thirty African States requested assessments (about
65%).
* Twenty-five percent of the European States requested
assessments.
" One hundred percent of the North American Region
requested assessments. 32
The results of assessments were confidential. The secretariat
did report on its assessment findings in terms of gross numbers,
however, as discussed below.
B. THE ICAO UNIVERSAL SAFETY OVERSIGHT AUDIT PROGRAM
The fact that the ICAO assessment program was voluntary,
that it was not a comprehensive audit, and that it lacked trans-
parency because of its confidentiality provisions caused many to
continue efforts to improve the program. Without changes in
such areas, the ICAO program was viewed as helpful, but not
enough to be relied upon as a substitute for the unilateral U.S.
31 The United States contributed $150,000 and two specialists to work on the
staff in Montreal.
32 There are only two States in the North American Region, the United States
and Canada.
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IASA assessments. The issue was not that the ICAO assessments
were not as comprehensive, or as technically valid as those of
FAA. In fact, the 1994-1995 efforts that were expended by ICAO
in developing detailed documentation and training set the stage
for what could be argued to be a program that was both more
consistent and better staffed by inspectors who were more up-to-
date in the ICAO standards and recommended practices than
the similar practices of FAA. U.S. FAA inspectors generally had
little training in these matters, and no standardized guidance
documentation for the conduct of their audits. The real issues
were a lack of depth of the ICAO assessments, a lack of trans-
parency, the confidentiality of the program, and its voluntary
nature.
After the adoption of the framework for the voluntary assess-
ment program, the ICAO Air Navigation Commission and the
Secretariat continued to develop means to strengthen the pro-
gram. These efforts were arduous both in substance and in the
need to balance strong concerns about sovereignty, and a desire
not to make the results public on the one hand, but to make
them available to other states for aviation safety improvement.
The President of the ICAO Council, Dr. Assad Kotaite, devel-
oped the mechanism to make "mandatory" audits acceptable to
the member states.33 By 1997, ICAO developed a suggested pro-
gram that had the potential to meet these objectives. An ex-
traordinary meeting of Directors General of Civil Aviation
(DGCA) was called for November 10-12, 1997 to discuss the
safety oversight program and develop support for the imple-
mentation of this initiative.
The 1997 DGCA Conference was a milestone event in the his-
tory of ICAO. There are only two bodies with "legislative" power
in ICAO, the Assembly of member States, meeting en banc, and
the Council, elected by the Assembly. All other ICAO bodies
are advisory. The Air Navigation Commission is provided for in
the Convention, but its function is to give technical advice to the
Council. ICAO has developed divisional meetings and Air Navi-
gation Conferences to get States' advice, technical input and
agreement on a variety of matters, but the divisional meetings
and conferences' recommendations still have to go through the
ICAO approval process. The 1997 DGCA Conference was
neither an Air Navigation Conference nor a divisional meeting,
"3 They would be mandatory, with the agreement of the individual States. It
seems contradictory, but it works.
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and therefore had no precedent in the hierarchy of ICAO deci-
sion-making. But it had the undeniable authority of its partici-
pants, possibly the most senior level group gathered to discuss a
technical agenda since the very early days of the Provisional
ICAO. It was agreed by the Council that any new program rec-
ommended by the DGCA Conference would also require an As-
sembly resolution supporting a change in the nature of the
program from voluntary to mandatory, so the question would
need to be taken to 32nd Assembly in 1998.
When the DGCA Conference began, a number of papers pre-
pared in advance of the meeting outlined the issues to be dis-
cussed. One of the more substantive papers to form the debate,
"Results From the ICAO Safety Oversight Programme" '' re-
vealed some interesting statistics from the first 45 assessments
conducted by ICAO under the assessment program:
" Only 35 percent of the States (15) had basic aviation
legislatoin that is kept current through an amendment
and revision mechanism.
" Some 47 percent of the States (21) had a code of air
navigation regulations encompassing, for example, op-
erating regulations for the establishment of a CAA (civil
aviation authority). However only 24 percent of the
States (5) had an amendment procedure in place.
" While 42 percent (19) had regulations and orders on
operations, only 22 percent of the States (4) had en-
forcement provisions in place and 29 percent (5) had
an appropriate content and amendment procedure.
In addition:
N Although 75 percent of the States (33) analyzed had a
CAA organizational structure, in only 51 percent of
them (23) the CAA had adequate legal status.
E Only 22 percent of the forty-five States (10) had ade-
quate staffing and qualified inspectors to perform safety
oversight functions.
0 29 percent of these forty-five States (13) were consid-
ered to have adequate funding to conduct their
activities.
E Only 13 percent (6) were found to have adequate in-
spector training, while 18 percent (8) had established a
54 RESULTS FROM THE ICOA SAFETY OVERSIGHT PROGRAMME (DGCA, Working
Paper 97-WP, 1997).
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system for the certification and inspection of training
centers.
With regard to certification and supervision of commercial air
transport operators, the report disclosed the following:
" Only 40 percent of the States (18) analyzed had an es-
tablished system for the certification of commercial air
transport operators.
" Only 24 percent (11) had an established system for the
surveillance of certificated commercial air transport
operators.
" Only 9 percent of the States (4) had adequate inspector
guidance material for the conduct of their duties.
" Only 31 percent (14) had the authority to refuse, revoke
or amend an AOC (airline operating certificate).
" Only 20 percent (9) had a requirement for the ex-
change of mandatory airworthiness information.
Forty-five States is about twenty-five percent of the total mem-
bership, but the numbers should not be extrapolated to cover
the entire Organization. Most early assessments were requested
by and conducted in developing States whose officials knew they
had a problem. Nevertheless, these data clearly showed the op-
portunity for improvement that awaited an effective mandatory
audit program.
The ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Program
(IUSOAP),3" developed in detail by the President of the Coun-
cil, the Air Navigation Commission and Secretariat, as recom-
mended by the DGCA conference, and as approved by Council
and the 32nd Assembly, has the following characteristics:
35 The Universal Safety Oversight Audit Program represents an ICAO success
story. In just about 6 years a cultural change occurred, moving ICAO from a fifty-
four year passive reliance on States' compliance with Article 38, to an Organiza-
tion aggressively pursuing the implementation of its Standards, Recommended
Practices and procedures. Credit goes to all the members of the Air Navigation
Commission, and the Secretariat during that time, especially Richard Allison,
who chaired the Commission ad hoc working group for the entire period; Mike
Comber, President of the ANC in 1995; Victor Aguado, President since 1996; and
Marcel Cadieux, Chief of the ICAO Ops. Air section of the Air Navigation Bu-
reau, who actually implemented the programs at the start. In the Council Dr.
Kotaite, the President of the Council, was a most valuable player, along with
Carol Carmody, the U.S. Representative (who not only had to keep the Council
on the right road, but had to energize the FAA at the right moments as well) and
Douglas Evans, the United Kingdom Representative (who helped ensure the
strong UK and ECAC stand on the program).
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1. an audit rather than an assessment;"6
2. universal (mandatory);
3. much larger degree of transparency; and
4. funded from the ICAO budget.
At the implementation of the new program 67 States had al-
ready been assessed under the voluntary program. It was de-
cided that these States would simply undergo an assessment
follow up audit to review their progress and upgrade the States
to the new requirements. The remaining 117 States (now 120,
with 3 new accessions to the Convention since that time) would
get full audits and all States would be subject to follow-up audits
one to two years after the initial audit.
A team comprising three to eight members would conduct
the audits. The core team members, covering each of the licens-
ing, maintenance and operations disciplines, would have re-
ceived formal ICAO training. (There may be team members
who are undergoing informal OJT.) Each mission would in-
clude two States and five to twenty-one days would be spent in
each State. The audits include industry visits, but the focus is on
the government.
The audit consists of review of compliance with the Chicago
Convention and State regulations; conformance with ICAO
Standards; and adherence to recommended practices, related
procedures, guidance materials, and relevant industry practices
in general use. Specifically, the ICAO teams look at national
aviation legislation and specific regulations; organizational
structure and legal status of the State's CAA; system for certifica-
tion and continued surveillance of aircraft, personnel and oper-
ators; and implementation of Standards and Recommended
Practices.
The products and timeline are:
-46 What is the difference between an audit and an assessment? An audit, at
least in this case, is much more thorough than an assessment. Where the assess-
ment concentrated on Standards and Recommended Practices, the audit also
considered existing guidance material and industry practice.
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TIMELINE -
PRODUCTS Days
Findings and Recommendations 21
Interim Report 21
State Corrective Action Plan 30
(Preliminary Review) 21
Final and Summary Reports 21
Team Leader Mission Report State Provides Comments 21
Summary Report Released
Total 135
There were several outstanding questions. First,
term:
in the short
1. Quality of the ICAO Assessments/Audits. The summary
reports have been very well received because they, in fact,
did allow a proper assessment of the safety oversight capa-
bilities of the audited States. However, from the begin-
ning of the ICAO Safety Oversight Program, some have
felt that there needs to be a quality assurance mechanism
in place to ensure that all States are being audited on an
equal basis. Various proposals are being discussed in
ICAO to implement some kind of quality assessment.
2. Follow-up activity - the "fix it" part. Significant shortcom-
ings have been found in a number of States and many of
those States feel they require assistance. The 33rd Assem-
bly established a voluntary fund to provide assistance to
States, but it appears unlikely this will provide significant
relief.
3. What about IASA. The final question, and perhaps the
most interesting, is what changes might occur in FAA's
IASA program?
Then, in the longer term:
1. Expansion of the Program. The DGCA Conference
agreed that the program should be expanded to include
airports (Annex 14) and air traffic services (Annex 11) at
the appropriate time. The appropriate time was to be de-
termined by the success of the established program and
the availability of resources. The 33rd Assembly agreed
that that the time had come and recommended expan-
sion of the program to include Annexes 11 and 14, and
selected provisions of Annex 13 (Aircraft Accident and In-
cident Reporting). The events of September 11 lead to
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the implementation of mandatory audits related to Annex
17, Security. The question is how well will ICAO be able
to implement these new programs without diminishing
the existing IUSOAP?
2. The nature and funding of the program after the initial
audits are complete. The 32nd Assembly agreed to fund
a significant portion of the IUSOAP program from sur-
plus money from the previous triennium. The 33rd As-
sembly agreed to fund a significant portion of the
expanded program from surplus money. However, at the
time of the Assembly, the expansion was not anticipated
to be "operational" until the third year of the triennium.
The next Ordinary session of the ICAO Assembly will be
asked to fund audit programs for seven to ten Annexes.
This goes against a general policy on the part of some
major contributor States to move from "zero real growth"
to "zero nominal growth" in the UN specialized agencies'
budgetsY
C. EVOLUTION OF THE FAA AND ICAO PROGRAMS
By late 2001, the ICAO Safety Oversight Program had become
ensconced as a truly effective audit program. At the end of the
year, the ICAO accomplishments 8 were truly remarkable: the
total number of audited States numbered 178, in addition to 5
territories. Of those, 165 States had submitted corrective action
plans to address improvements that the audit had pointed to.
Also, ICAO had prepared 159 summary reports of the audits for
the use of member States. In addition, ICAO established39 a set
of fundamental auditing principles in which each audit team
member was trained: sovereignty; universality (of the audits);
transparency and disclosure; timeliness; all-inclusiveness; system-
atic, consistent and objective (audits); fairness; and quality. To
provide guidance in these principles, documentation and train-
ing has also been made available:" Safety Oversight Audit Man-
ual; Safety Oversight Manual, Part A, The Establishment and
37 Simplistically "zero real growth" allows for increases due to inflation, "zero
nominal growth" does not. It must be said that the U.S. State Department sup-
ported IUSOAP expansion and did not insist on ZNG during the 33rd Assembly.
38 PROGRESS OF THE ICAO UNIVERSAL SAFETY OVERSIGHT AUDIT PROGRAM
(ICAO Council, Working Paper, C-WP/11749, 2002).
9 REPORT ON THE ICAO UNIVERSAL SAFEry OVERSIGHT AUDrI PROGRAMME
(ICAO, Working Paper, A33-WP/47, 2001) (prepared for the 33rd Assembly).
40 A comprehensive publications catalog is available at www.icao.int.
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Management of a State's Safety Oversight System; Safety Over-
sight Pre-Audit Questionnaire; Safety Oversight Auditors Hand-
book; and Auditor's Training Courses.
FAA has completed, as of late 2001, IASA assessments of 97
countries, 25 of which have been found not to meet ICAO stan-
dards for safety oversight.4' Broadly speaking, an examination
of nearly all of the situations in which FAA has found oversight
shortcomings has shown that audit material developed by ICAO
concerning these countries shows similar deficiencies. Because
of this, FAA is in the process of changing its fundamental poli-
cies, aiming to use the information developed by ICAO in FAA's
assessment summary reports as an update on the compliance of
the safety oversight system in other countries with ICAO stan-
dards. In addition, FAA intends to adopt 1CAO documentation
for the conduct of FAA IASA assessments, and is in the process
of developing guidance material for FAA inspectors that will set
this standard for them. The FAA goal is to eliminate, insofar as
practical, unilateral U.S. visits and assessments of other coun-
tries in favor of reliance on ICAO developed material. It is im-
portant to note that in pursuing this goal, FAA cannot cede the
authority of the Administrator to ICAO (or any other body)
when it comes to judging the compliance posture of other coun-
tries with regard to ICAO safety oversight obligations. The U.S.
will always retain the authority to determine for itself if others
comply satisfactorily with these obligations. But increased reli-
ance upon, and acceptance of, the ICAO activity, instead of car-
rying out completely unilateral (and in some ways redundant)
assessment visits, should be the norm for FAA in the future.4 2
This approach can be expected to increase the transparency of
FAA's program and at the same time increase efficiency and re-
duce the cost of FAA programs.
D. DOES OVERSIGHT MATTER?
One may justifiably question whether the government over-
sight of airlines is, in the scheme of things, an important factor
41 FAA announced a revision to the Categorization of IASA results. Only 2
categories are now used: Category 1 for countries whose oversight meets ICAO
standards, and Category 2 for those whose oversight is substandard. Changes to
the International Safety Assessment (IASA) Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 33,751 (May
25, 2000).
42 That is not to say that FAA would cede its ability to "see for itself." If ICAO
developed material is inadequate, raises unanswered questions, or other circum-
stances warrant, FAA Would revert to an on-site assessment if another country
sought to expand its services, or create new airline service to the U.S.
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in airline safety. Several studies have shown that the quality of
safety oversight is strongly correlated with the safety record of
airlines. In 1996, Capt. Amjad Faizi (Chief Pilot, Corporate
Safety, of Pakistan International Airlines) noted that airlines
from countries whose total traffic represents only 16% of the
world total had experienced, in one year, 66% of the hull losses,
83% of the approach and landing accidents, and 75% of the
CFIT (controlled flight into terrain) accidents in the world.4"
He noted that, in most of these countries, "slackness in regula-
tory functions is perhaps the biggest hurdle" to reducing this
poor accident record.
Ronald Ashford has made a real contribution44 by analyzing
the safety records of airlines from countries that had been as-
sessed by FAA for compliance with ICAO safety oversight stan-
dards. At the time of his analysis (early 1997), 60 countries had
received FAA IASA assessments, and 33 of the countries had
been found by FAA to comply with ICAO safety oversight stan-
dards. For the five-year period ending 30 June, 1996, the fatal
accident rate of the countries complying with ICAO standards
was about 8 times better than that of the countries found not to
comply with ICAO safety oversight standards. Finally, ICAO has
seen the similar correlations in its analysis of accident data. A
strong tie between accident rates and unsatisfactory safety over-
sight is clearly evident in the results of ICAO audits."
Proper safety oversight of commercial airlines by govern-
ments, as is required by international treaty, has been shown to
be highly correlated with relatively good safety records for these
airlines. These data, coupled with the Common sense notion
that adherence to international obligations is expected by other
nations, has led to a welcome emphasis on safety as a high prior-
ity in ICAO and a sea change in the way government safety over-
sight is viewed throughout the world. The FAA IASA program
has resulted in at least 19 countries46 upgrading their safety
oversight programs to better meet the standards set by ICAO.
43 Capt. Amjad Faizi, Remarks at the 49th Annual Flight Safety Foundation
International Air Safety Seminar held at Dubai (1996).
44 Global Airline Safety - The Problem and Possible Solutions, presented at the ICAO
Conference on Safety Oversight in the CAR Region, Montego Bay (Oct. 22-24,
1997).
45 PROGRESS OF THE ICAO UNIVERSAL SAFETY OVERSIGHT PROGRAM, (ICAO,
Working Paper C-WP/11598, 2001).
46 Aruba, Bahamas, Bolivia, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ghana, Israel, Jamaica, Jor-
dan, Korea, Kuwait, Morocco, Netherlands Antilles, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
and Turkey. El Salvador and Trinidad & Tobago have unfortunately slipped back
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The safety leverage provided by these improvements is difficult
to measure precisely. But as Ashford has shown, the actual air-
line safety records demonstrated by countries that meet ICAO
oversight standards are markedly better than those that do not.
In addition to those countries that have been upgraded into Cat-
egory 1 by FAA, it is inescapable that both the ICAO and FAA
programs have brought about a heightened sense of safety
awareness in all countries. This cannot but have helped contrib-
ute to the continuing decline in international civil aviation fatal
accidents.
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Oversight quality does matter, and the data support that no-
tion. The 33rd ICAO Assembly in 2001 and subsequent discus-
sions have set ICAO on a clear course to expand its safety
oversight audit program to encompass the full range of safety
and security standards ICAO has established. States must con-
tinue to support these efforts both financially and with in-kind
services of seconded personnel and cooperation, as has been
the case in the past, because ICAO has no source of funds other
than those raised by annual assessments and voluntary contribu-
tions of its members.
The changes wrought in the past decade within ICAO have
had extraordinarily positive impacts on safety awareness
throughout the world. Experience shows that this will result in
lives saved through accidents avoided. But we cannot assume
that all problems are solved. There remain budget issues in
ICAO because the "zero growth" policies of the G7 countries
continue to cause problems for properly accommodating the
funding of audit programs within the ICAO budget. This must
be changed if the program is to continue. Countries whose au-
dits identify deficiencies must find means to correct those defi-
ciencies, beginning with commitments at the very highest
political levels. Without such a commitment, experience has
also shown that safety shortcomings will persist, and avoidable
accidents will result.
into Category 2 after having been upgraded. (Private Communication, Robert D.
Papkin)
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